Haiti: End of MMAS Mandate, Uncertainties Around New International Force
By La Rédaction · Port-au-Prince · · 5 min read · Updated 24 April 2026
Translated from French — AI-assisted and reviewed by the editorial team. The French version is authoritative. Read the original · About our translation policy
“I don’t know why they came. They changed nothing. Their presence improved nothing,” declares a resident of Fort-National who lost everything. This October 2, 2025, marked the official end of the mandate of the Multinational Security Support (MMAS) Mission in Haiti. Launched with the support of the UN Security Council and led by Kenya, this mission, intended to support the Haitian National Police (PNH) in the fight against gangs, failed to reverse the spiral of violence plaguing the country.
As the international community prepares a new “more robust” force to take over, reactions are multiplying: between hope, skepticism, and concerns about national sovereignty.
A Country on the Brink: The OPC’s Cry of Alarm in Geneva
Invited to the 60th session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, the Citizen Protector, Jean Wilner Morin, painted a chilling picture. “One million two hundred thousand people live in extreme promiscuity in displacement camps, thousands of children no longer go to school, hospitals and churches have been set on fire by bandits,” he denounced.
Alongside Director General Jude Jean-Pierre, he warned of the risk of a major humanitarian catastrophe, while calling for “effective” international solidarity in the face of an overwhelmed state and depleted institutions.
But behind the humanitarian appeal lies a deeper question: what remains of the Haitian state’s capacity to guarantee the security and dignity of its people?
“The state either does not want to or cannot solve the problem of insecurity ,” declares the Co-director of Collectif Défenseurs Plus, Antonal Mortimé.
For this human rights defender, the failure of the MMAS is not a surprise. According to him, the mission never had the financial or operational means to act effectively. “MMAS la se te yon misyon volontè, kote chak peyi te gen dwa bay kòb si yo vle. Gen ki pwomèt, men yo pa bay. Nou pa t wè yo nan lari a, pandan bandi yo ap elaji teritwa yo,” he laments.
The activist questions the failure of governance and the lack of political will: “The authorities either do not want to or cannot fight insecurity. If there were security, we would have already organized elections. Haiti is experiencing an unprecedented governance crisis, a moral crisis, and institutional instability.”
According to Me Mortimé, the withdrawal of the MMAS only reveals the extent of the vacuum: a country without a Parliament, a contested presidency, and an infiltrated and under-resourced national police. “Gen twòp mainmise sou lapolis,” he warns, referring to alleged links between government members and gang leaders.
A New “Robust” Force: Reinforcement or Renunciation?
The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2793, authorizing the deployment of a more robust multinational force, with a joint military and police command. Countries such as Kenya, the United States, Canada, Panama, Jamaica, El Salvador, and Trinidad and Tobago will participate.
But for Mortimé, this new mission raises crucial questions: “Every time the UN authorizes the deployment of a force in a country, it is a sign that there is a societal crisis, a state crisis. This mission means that the state has resigned.”
He fears that the arrival of this force will lead to a new loss of sovereignty: “In terms of sovereignty, the Haitian state risks losing control over what happens in the country.”
However, he recognizes the need for a security response to gangs that now control nearly three departments of the country. Since the departure of MINUSTAH and especially after the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, “bandi yo mande anraje,” he emphasizes.
Sovereignty and Accountability: A Fragile Balance
Mortimé calls for citizen vigilance and the establishment of clear control mechanisms to prevent abuses: “There must be a complaint mechanism accessible to everyone. The press, the OPC, and universities must be able to observe what is happening. Only in this way can we avoid abusive acts, collateral damage, and innocent victims.”
These safeguards, according to him, are essential to ensure that this mission does not repeat past errors, particularly those of MINUSTAH, which was accused of serious human rights violations and the spread of cholera.
The Haitian Dilemma: International Aid or National Rehabilitation?
The end of the MMAS and the preparation of a new mission reignite an existential debate: Can Haiti still ensure its own security?
Between the fear of international tutelage and the reality of a failing state, the country finds itself in a painful paradox. Jean Wilner Morin, the Citizen Protector, advocates for strengthened international cooperation, while Mortimé warns against dependence. The two men, though on different registers, share the same diagnosis: without a political and moral awakening, no foreign force, however robust, will be able to extricate Haiti from the spiral of violence. “Facing bandits, fighting gangs is first and foremost the responsibility of Haitian institutions,” concludes Mortimé. “If we do not return to democratic normalcy, we will continue to live in the same spiral of violence.” A New Mission, But No New Social Contract The fundamental question therefore remains: can a country be pacified without rebuilding its state? Can we speak of lasting security without profound reform in Haitian justice? The cycle of UN missions and other approved missions, from MINUSTAH to MMAS, and soon to a new international force, illustrates the limits of a strictly security-focused approach. What Haiti needs today is less a “robust force” than authentic political will, credible justice, and a legitimate state capable of protecting its citizens without delegating its sovereignty. For as long as the roots of the political, institutional, and moral crisis remain intact, peace, like democracy, will remain a promise without a future.
Between the fear of international tutelage and the reality of a failing state, the country finds itself in a painful paradox. Jean Wilner Morin, the Citizen Protector, advocates for strengthened international cooperation, while Mortimé warns against dependence. The two men, though on different registers, share the same diagnosis: without a political and moral awakening, no foreign force, however robust, will be able to extricate Haiti from the spiral of violence. “Facing bandits, fighting gangs is first and foremost the responsibility of Haitian institutions,” concludes Mortimé. “If we do not return to democratic normalcy, we will continue to live in the same spiral of violence.” A New Mission, But No New Social Contract The fundamental question therefore remains: can a country be pacified without rebuilding its state? Can we speak of lasting security without profound reform in Haitian justice? The cycle of UN missions and other approved missions, from MINUSTAH to MMAS, and soon to a new international force, illustrates the limits of a strictly security-focused approach. What Haiti needs today is less a “robust force” than authentic political will, credible justice, and a legitimate state capable of protecting its citizens without delegating its sovereignty. For as long as the roots of the political, institutional, and moral crisis remain intact, peace, like democracy, will remain a promise without a future.
