One Year Since the Deployment of the First Kenyan Contingent: When Data Speaks of the MMAS's Bitter Failure

One year after the launch of the Multinational Security Support Mission (MMAS) in Haiti, the figures are stark. The security situation has deteriorated, population displacement has reached unprecedented levels, and the mission struggles to establish itself on the ground. The specter of another international failure looms, recalling the limitations of MINUSTAH, dissolved in 2017 without having durably stabilized the country. One Year Later: An Alarming Assessment Since the arrival of the first Kenyan contingent in June 2024, violence in Haiti has not slowed. According to the United Nations, at least 2,680 people have been killed and 957 injured since the beginning of 2025. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports 1.3 million internally displaced persons, representing nearly 11% of the Haitian population. These figures reflect the mission's inability to contain the advance of armed groups, which continue to gain ground. Several territories, notably Kenscoff, Delmas 19 and 30, Carrefour-Feuilles, Nazon, Mirebalais, Saut-d’Eau, and La Chapelle, have now fallen under the control of armed gangs, described as terrorist groups by the United States last May. Port-au-Prince was listed by an organization in Mexico as the most dangerous city in the world in 2024 with a high homicide rate surpassing dangerous cities in that country. Another International Failure in Perspective? The current situation somewhat revives memories of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), widely criticized for its ineffectiveness and its withdrawal without lasting results. Like MINUSTAH, the MMAS seems trapped in a dynamic of powerlessness. Staffing is insufficient: of the 2,500 military personnel planned, only 991 have been deployed, mainly from Kenya, Jamaica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Bahamas. Logistical and financial resources are lacking, and the mission has not yet established all of its operational bases. What Are the Causes of This Apparent Failure? Several factors explain this situation. Internally, the Haitian state is severely weakened. Institutions are dysfunctional, the national police forces are overwhelmed, and transitional authorities struggle to coordinate an effective response strategy. Structural flaws, a lack of political leadership, and the fragmentation of power centers complicate the mission's support by local authorities. Externally, the MMAS suffers from limited international support. Mission funding remains insufficient, and the commitment of UN member states is timid. Several countries that promised troops have still not sent them. Furthermore, the lessons from MINUSTAH have not been fully learned, particularly regarding intervention strategy, proximity to the population, and respect for local dynamics. Aggravating Factors Not to Be Overlooked The rapid evolution of armed groups further complicates the situation. These gangs use increasingly sophisticated tactics: control of national roads, illegal taxation of travelers, burning of entire neighborhoods, rapid establishment in new territories, population flight, mass assassination, collective rape, etc. Their entrenchment in the social fabric, access to financial resources, and ability to maneuver politically make them difficult to dislodge. The MMAS, limited in its personnel and resources, faces a threat that has become hybrid, where the lines between organized crime and terrorism tend to disappear. And Tomorrow? Prospects remain uncertain. Human Rights Watch and several international organizations advocate for the transformation of the MMAS into a true United Nations mission, endowed with a robust mandate, substantial funding, and an operational force capable of securing the territory. Otherwise, the current mission risks getting bogged down and joining the long list of international attempts that have failed to stabilize Haiti. Without a coordinated, integrated, and sustainable response, the security crisis could continue to worsen in the coming months, prolonging the suffering of the displaced and further expanding the scope of armed groups. One year after its deployment, the MMAS is now at a turning point: either it receives the necessary political and material support to succeed, or it heads towards another failure with dramatic consequences for Haiti. Furthermore, since the deployment on Haitian soil, Kenyan police officers have seen two of their own killed in Artibonite in clashes with the Gran Grif gang; equipment has been burned, and injuries have also been reported among these members of the multinational force. Wideberlin Sénexant