Towards the Reconquest of National Territory, the Government Declares a Crusade Against Gangs

Between demonstrations of authority and political communication, the State multiplies symbols without dispelling doubts. If propaganda leaves no room for effective efforts towards tangible security for citizens, the ambitious reconquest will remain nothing more than a pipe dream. PORT-AU-PRINCE.— The institutional offensive launched in recent days by the transitional authorities is resolutely muscular. After a notable visit to the Western Departmental Directorate (DDO 1), the president of the Transitional Presidential Council, Laurent Saint-Cyr, and Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé led a high-level delegation to the General Headquarters of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H) at Champ-de-Mars this Monday, January 26. Beyond appearances, the government clearly seeks to project the image of a State regaining its footing and intending to regain control of the national territory. It remains to be seen whether this succession of institutional signals will translate into concrete effects on the ground. For while the official discourse evokes the restoration of state authority and the modernization of the security apparatus, the reality remains marked by territorial fragmentation, the weakening of institutions, and the persistence of a criminal economy well-established in several strategic areas of the country. Between demonstrations of authority and political communication, the government wants to show that it governs In his statements, the Prime Minister insisted on the need to build a modern and operational army alongside a Haitian National Police (PNH) exhausted by years of asymmetric struggle against heavily armed groups. The objective seems laudable, but resources, planning, and timelines remain unclear. Military reform, often mentioned since 2017, has never truly gone beyond the stage of intentions. Above all, the fundamental question remains: what doctrine of employment for the FAd’H in a context marked by internal conflicts where the lines between internal security and national defense overlap? No clear answer has been provided so far. Between security ambition and institutional reality, the State multiplies symbols without dispelling doubts The government presents territorial reconquest as a prerequisite for the general elections scheduled for 2026. However, several observers note that the State still struggles to control areas located a few hundred meters from official buildings. The ability to secure a national electoral cycle therefore seems to depend less on declarations than on a genuine security buildup, which remains to be demonstrated. Furthermore, the authorities commend the commitment and discipline of the FAd’H. But the question of recruitment, supervision, equipment, and training remains poorly documented. Without these pillars, the idea of a professional army risks remaining a political argument rather than an operational project. The narrative of reconquest remains unconvincing In the background, the government attempts to reconstruct a narrative of a strong State, after several years of institutional collapse and the privatization of violence. However, this reconquest, presented as progressive and sustainable, still faces several major obstacles: funding, inter-agency coordination, lack of doctrinal unity, and international pressures. The stakes extend far beyond the security sphere. They condition the government's ability to restore trust, revive democratic life, and prevent the definitive entrenchment of a para-state order dominated by armed groups. For now, the transition relies on strong images, authoritative visits, and solemn commitments. It remains to transform these communication sequences into state mechanisms, effective territoriality, and tangible security for citizens; otherwise, the announced reconquest risks being merely a symbolic one. Jean Mapou / Le Relief