Since the beginning of his first term, Donald Trump, the 45th President of the United States, has favored the use of economic sanctions over direct military force to defend American interests on the international stage. This strategy is part of an evolution in U.S. power tools, marking a preference for economic coercion over classic armed intervention.
Historically, American foreign policy has oscillated between two main orientations: isolationism – particularly in the 19th century and during the interwar period – and interventionism, which dominated from World War II onwards. Donald Trump, for his part, introduced a new dynamic, articulated around the slogan «America First,» combining a relative withdrawal from multilateralism and an intensive use of unilateral coercive measures, such as economic and trade sanctions.
Since his triumphant return to the White House, following a presidential election won handily, President Donald Trump has made a clear assessment of the United States' place in the international arena, both militarily and economically. He believes that, in what he calls the «jungle of international relations,» American economic power is threatened by the emergence or rise of major economic blocs, notably People's China, India, Brazil, and the European Union.
Facing a chronic trade deficit, which Trump deems unacceptable, his administration opted for an offensive foreign trade policy. Thus, the United States imposed particularly high tariffs on imports from several countries, with the stated objective of rebalancing the trade balance and reviving industrial employment on American soil — a flagship promise of his election campaign.
Countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and Mexico were particularly targeted by these measures, accused of benefiting from trade agreements deemed disadvantageous to American interests. This protectionist and unilateral approach marks a break with the free trade traditionally advocated by previous administrations.
However, beyond the use of economic sanctions as a primary lever of influence, the American administration possesses other instruments of power, notably the extraterritoriality of its justice system. This mechanism, which allows the United States to impose its laws beyond its borders, is often used to prosecute or sanction foreign actors whose actions are perceived as contrary to American strategic interests.
A recent example illustrates this strategy: Brazil, one of the pillars of BRICS+, is adopting a more independent foreign policy under the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, marked by a rapprochement with Russia, in the midst of the war against Ukraine. This geopolitical orientation, deemed unacceptable by Washington, has led to an increase in American tariffs on certain Brazilian products, as well as targeted sanctions.
Among these, measures were taken against a Brazilian Supreme Court judge, accused of acting against Washington's interests by issuing an arrest warrant against Jair Bolsonaro, dubbed «the tropical Trump,» ideologically close to the former American president. Furthermore, restrictions were imposed on the X platform (formerly Twitter), as part of a political dispute between Brazilian authorities and certain digital actors influenced by the far-right.
As part of his electoral campaign for the 2024 presidential election, Donald Trump had promised to end the war in Ukraine in less than 24 hours if he returned to power. However, faced with the perpetuation of the conflict despite several telephone exchanges with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the continuation of the Russian military offensive, the former president adopted a firmer tone.
Trump thus threatened to impose particularly high tariffs on Russia, while also brandishing the possibility of secondary economic sanctions against countries that continue to buy Russian oil, notably China and India. He reportedly set an ultimatum until August 8 for Moscow to reach a peace agreement with Kyiv, failing which punitive measures would be triggered.
This strategy places India in a particularly delicate position. A major trading partner of the United States, New Delhi currently benefits from purchasing low-priced Russian oil, which strengthens its energy competitiveness and fuels its economic growth. Faced with American pressure, Indian authorities recently affirmed that they would not give up their supply of Russian oil, emphasizing their desire to preserve their energy and strategic independence.
As for China, although it is also concerned by American threats, it holds a stronger position. Thanks to the size of its domestic market, its influence on the global supply chain, and its economic leverage, Beijing can largely counterbalance potential American retaliatory measures. In this geoeconomic struggle, China proves less vulnerable than India, and more capable of resisting Washington's injunctions.
Donald Trump's desire to keep his campaign promises clashes with the complex reality of American power on the international stage. Although the United States possesses undeniable military and economic superiority, its ability to impose a favorable world order remains limited by budgetary constraints, strategic fatigue, and a public opinion increasingly reluctant to military engagement.
In this context, the Trump administration — like those that preceded it — is forced to juggle between the increased use of economic sanctions, perceived as a less costly and more flexible means of pressure, and a refusal of direct military interventions, deemed expensive and ineffective in the long term. This strategic choice reflects both a reorientation of American foreign policy towards economic neo-isolationism and a recognition of the limits of traditional military power in a multipolar and unstable world.