February 7, 2026: What Consensual Alternative?
By La Rédaction · Port-au-Prince · · 3 min read · Updated 24 April 2026
Translated from French — AI-assisted and reviewed by the editorial team. The French version is authoritative. Read the original · About our translation policy

Less than a month and two days before the deadline set by the April 3, 2024 Agreement, the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) finds itself at the heart of a major political impasse. The mandate of its nine members officially ends on February 7, 2026. Yet, despite numerous meetings and consultations, no consensual solution is emerging to ensure the continuity of the State within a framework consistent with the founding agreement of the transition.
Civil society and the traditional political class, long associated in the management of power since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, today share a common observation: the CPT has failed. Its record is marred by scandals, procrastinations, and a clear inability to respond to the security, institutional, and social emergency. However, these same actors struggle to overcome their differences to formulate a common and credible proposal.
In this climate of uncertainty, the CPT members themselves, implicitly acknowledging their limitations, are multiplying scenarios aimed at prolonging their presence in power. They argue that their mission cannot end with the expiration of their mandate, scheduled for February 7, 2026. This interpretation is contested, including by the international community which, while having contributed to the establishment of the CPT, now demands strict adherence to the April 3 Agreement and the departure of the council members at the scheduled deadline.
Concurrently, proposals are emerging from political parties and civil society organizations: an executive entrusted to a Supreme Court judge assisted by a Prime Minister, a reduced presidential council, a government of so-called patriotic technocrats, or a transition led solely by a Prime Minister. While these options differ in form, they all rest on the same requirement: a brief and effective transition, capable of producing results where Prime Minister Ariel Henry, the CPT, and its two successive governments have failed.
Haitian history, however, offers an illuminating precedent. In 1930, to ease political tensions and organize credible elections, a consensual provisional president was chosen in the person of Louis Eugène Roy (1852-1937). A stranger to partisan struggles, unanimously elected on March 20, 1930, and taking office on May 15, he successfully led the transition until the election of Sténio Vincent, after four rounds of voting.
This historical reminder underscores an often-neglected truth: in periods of acute crisis, stability depends on the ability of elites to prioritize the general interest and agree on figures and mechanisms of consensus.
As February 7, 2026, approaches, Haiti once again finds itself at a crossroads. The stakes are not only institutional. They are also moral and political. It is about whether national actors will be able to overcome personal calculations to make this date a break from chronic failure and the starting point for collective hope.



