Haiti: Banditry, Symptom of a State in Deep Crisis

Between armed violence, political predation, and a global economy of insecurity, Haiti's problem is not the absence of a state. It is its capture. This article is drawn from a thesis by my colleague Elie Rivage, Journalist, Jurist, Political Scientist, and spokesperson for the National College of Democrats PORT-AU-PRINCE.— The rise of armed groups in Haiti is often presented as the direct consequence of a failed state or endemic criminality. A more structured reading, however, allows us to move beyond these classic explanations. Banditry appears less as an anomaly than as the symptom of a deep state crisis, shaped by decades of predatory governance and embedded in a global economy of violence. For several years, the country has been sinking into a security spiral marked by the proliferation of weapons, the territorialization of gangs, and the paralysis of economic and social life. While institutional weakness and poverty play a role, they alone do not explain the persistence and organization of the phenomenon. Contrary to the idea of an absent state, the Haitian reality reveals instead a fragmented and captured state, whose institutions function selectively. Security is no longer a universal public good, but an unequally distributed resource. In this context, violence is often tolerated, even instrumentalized, as a tool for political and social regulation. The country's history shows that the use of armed groups is not new. Many political elites have, over time, used violent actors to consolidate their power, weaken their adversaries, and maintain an unstable order. Even today, this logic persists in fragmented forms, contributing to a climate of chronic insecurity. This situation aligns with the reflection of the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, for whom violence becomes dominant when legitimate authority and political dialogue cease to generate adherence. In Haiti, armed groups can thus be perceived as the product of a delegitimized political system, where force progressively replaces the social contract. A critical reading inspired by the works of Achille Mbembe also highlights a form of «necropolitics,» in which certain populations, particularly in popular neighborhoods, are permanently exposed to violence and death. This reality is part of a logic of structural marginalization, inherited in part from historical and international dynamics. Beyond national borders, Haitian insecurity is part of what some analysts call global security capitalism. Researchers like Naomi Klein or Mark Duffield have shown how prolonged crises fuel transnational markets related to armaments, private security, and humanitarian intervention. Haiti offers a striking illustration: although the country does not produce weapons, it is flooded with sophisticated equipment from international circuits. In this system, profits are generated elsewhere, while human consequences are concentrated locally. At the same time, the failure of public security favors the privatization of protection. Elites and certain businesses have access to private security arrangements, while the majority of the population remains exposed. The humanitarian economy, meanwhile, thrives in a context of permanent crisis, without necessarily addressing the structural causes of the problem. This dynamic creates a form of paradoxical stability: banditry becomes simultaneously politically useful, economically profitable, and socially destructive. Its persistence is therefore not accidental, but results from a convergence of interests that hinders any lasting resolution. In this context, exclusively security-focused responses appear insufficient. As long as the political and economic roots of violence are not addressed, efforts to restore order risk producing limited results. Banditry in Haiti cannot be reduced to a simple criminal deviation. It reveals a deep dysfunction of the state system and its integration into a global order where insecurity, paradoxically, becomes a resource. ###
…