October 11, 2025 — The return of the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) to the National Palace on Thursday, October 9, 2025, was intended to be a significant moment. After more than twenty months of the central government's absence from downtown Port-au-Prince, the executive held its first Council of Ministers within the Palace grounds, under high tension and amidst sporadic gunfire in the vicinity. Behind this highly symbolic gesture, three major decisions were announced: the adoption of the 2025-2026 budget, the abandonment of the new constitutional project, and the reorganization of the mandate of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP).
A Symbolic, Yet Fragile Return
This relocation of power to the heart of Champ-de-Mars, once locked down by violence, primarily aims to project the image of a state attempting to reassert itself. But the symbol does not mask the reality: the area remains unstable, and fear is omnipresent. The government's return to the National Palace, even under escort and reinforced protection, does not mean that the government has truly regained control of the territory. Rather, it illustrates the fragility of a state in search of physical as well as political existence.
The Abandonment of a Controversial Project
The executive decided to repeal the July 2024 decree establishing the national conference and to annul the referendum decree of June 24, 2025. This decision puts an end to a process that had met with strong resistance within society. The steering committee responsible for proposing a new constitution has had its mandate revoked.
This abandonment can be read as an implicit recognition of the political deadlock into which this project had fallen. After several months of tension, the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) seems to want to appease critics and redirect attention towards more urgent priorities, notably the country's governance and the preparation of promised elections, which are still without a calendar.
Elections Promised, But Still Without a Horizon
In its statement, the CPT reaffirms its desire to organize 'free, credible, and transparent' elections. However, no date, no plan, and no clear mechanism has been communicated. This vagueness, which persists four months before the theoretical end of the Presidential Council's mandate (set for February 7, 2026), fuels doubts about the actual feasibility of a return to constitutional order within the timeframe.
The CEP, whose mandate is to be 'reorganized,' remains a fragile structure, marked by distrust and successive reshuffles. In the absence of an electoral calendar or a clear logistical plan, this reaffirmation of the democratic process looks more like a political stance than an operational commitment.
A Strategic Turn, But Under Pressure
The adoption of the 2025-2026 budget, amounting to 345 billion gourdes, marks another step for the Council of Ministers. This budget, an increase from the previous fiscal year, symbolizes the government's desire to restart the administrative machinery. But this restart remains theoretical as long as institutions, tax revenues, and security stability are not re-established.
By shelving the new constitutional project, the CPT seeks to reposition itself on the ground of national consensus. However, without tangible results in terms of security and without a credible electoral roadmap, this decision risks appearing merely as a political reprieve, rather than a turning point.
A Government Facing Its Contradictions
Outwardly, the return to the Palace and the abandonment of the constitutional project reflect a desire for appeasement. In depth, however, they primarily reveal the isolation of a government confronted with its own limitations.
The CPT has not yet succeeded in establishing a structured dialogue with the country's key stakeholders, nor in inspiring the trust of a population exhausted by empty promises.
The decision to annul the constitutional process may mark the end of a controversial chapter, but it does not answer the essential question: how to sustainably exit the transition?
Without a clear vision, without an electoral calendar, and without a real resumption of territorial control, the current government risks becoming trapped in the same cycle of temporary management as its predecessors.
The return to the National Palace will therefore remain, for now, a strong but hollow symbol of a state that is still trying to exist in a country where the Republic struggles to be heard.