BreakingThe Major Problems of the Draft Electoral Decree
This draft should not be treated as a mere technical text on elections. It raises serious constitutional, institutional, democratic, and political problems.
By La Rédaction · Port-au-Prince
· 4 min read
Translated from French — AI-assisted and reviewed by the editorial team. The French version is authoritative. Read the original · About our translation policy

1. It attempts to disguise a constitutional referendum as a “popular ratification.”
The text speaks of “popular ratification” regarding proposed changes to the Constitution. But in substance, it is a popular consultation on the Constitution. However, Article 284.3 of the Haitian Constitution formally prohibits any popular consultation aimed at amending the Constitution by referendum.
2. It mixes general elections with a constitutional question.
The draft provides that this “popular ratification” be held at the same time as the first round of the presidential and legislative elections. This is dangerous because it overloads the ballot, blurs public debate, and risks passing constitutional changes amid electoral confusion.
3. It weakens the independence of the CEP.
The text proclaims the autonomy of the CEP, but it subjects its regulations, procedures, and code of ethics to an order of the Prime Minister. This is a major contradiction: one cannot speak of an independent electoral body if the Executive retains leverage over its internal rules.
4. It creates a Director General of the CEP who is too powerful and too closely tied to the Executive.
The Director General is appointed by an order issued in the Council of Ministers. In the event of a deadlock in the CEP's decision-making body, he may exercise the powers of that body. This opens a dangerous door to administrative capture of the electoral process.
5. It allows for the neutralization of CEP members through quorum and absence rules.
After three consecutive absences, a CEP member may be considered resigned, with the case forwarded to the Executive. In a fragile political context, an operational rule can become a tool of pressure.
6. It gives the CEP excessive powers over the right to vote.
The right to vote may be suspended for very broad reasons: tax non-compliance, administrative or criminal investigation, professional sanctions, arrest warrant, international sanctions, or even public reputation. A fundamental right should not depend on so many administrative and discretionary criteria.
7. It allows for the exclusion of citizens based on allegations or “notoriety.”
The text uses notions like “notoriously known” to justify exclusions. In a country where political accusations, rumors, and reports can be weaponized, this is extremely dangerous.
8. It adds heavy bureaucratic filters for candidacies.
Candidates, especially for the presidency, must meet numerous additional requirements: tax compliance, mental health, asset declarations, absence of investigations, absence of administrative sanctions, etc. Some requirements may be legitimate, but their accumulation creates a political filtering mechanism.
9. It creates an almost insurmountable barrier for independent candidates.
The requirement of a very high number of endorsements for an independent candidacy, with precise identification data, risks locking the game in favor of major political machines or already structured actors.
10. It reduces the space for independent electoral observation.
Observers cannot publish partial results or trends before the CEP, under threat of sanctions. The CEP can also revoke their accreditation. In a country in a crisis of trust, independent observation must be protected, not tamed.
11. It relies on rapid digital transmission without sufficient safeguards.
Electronic transmission of minutes and voting data can be useful. But the text does not provide enough guarantees on cybersecurity, independent audit, chain of custody, public verification, and reconciliation between paper minutes and digital data.
12. It introduces the “none of the candidates” option without a clear legal effect.
The text allows voters to vote for “none of the candidates,” but without explaining what happens if this option receives a significant score. This gives an illusion of democratic protest while neutralizing its consequences.
13. It excessively restricts political speech.
The text prohibits certain forms of polemic, denigration, or offense. The fight against violent or sexist speech is necessary, but overly vague notions can also be used to sanction political criticism, journalistic investigation, or denunciation of corruption.
14. It over-penalizes the electoral process.
The draft multiplies criminal sanctions, prison sentences, and heavy fines. An electoral decree must protect the integrity of the vote, but it should not turn the election into a regime of judicial intimidation.
15. It concentrates too much power in the name of transparency.
The text uses the words “modernization,” “transparency,” “inclusion,” and “integrity.” But behind this vocabulary, it concentrates a great deal of power between the CEP, its Director General, the Executive, and administrative exclusion mechanisms.
This draft does not resemble a simple electoral decree. It resembles an attempt to push through, under the guise of elections, a much broader constitutional, political, and administrative operation. The real danger lies here: using the organization of elections to circumvent the Constitution, control the electoral process, and filter political participation.
Main source: Draft electoral decree of May 22, 2026.



