Critical Reflections on the Standardization of Elective Terms to Five Years
Amb. Roudy Stanley Penn Power, with all the privileges it implies, would be exercised without limit by those who hold it if no rules framed it. In the past, two principles dominated: the seizure of power and its preservation.
By La Rédaction · Port-au-Prince
· 7 min read · Updated 24 April 2026
Translated from French — AI-assisted and reviewed by the editorial team. The French version is authoritative. Read the original · About our translation policy
Amb. Roudy Stanley Penn
Power, with all the privileges it implies, would be exercised without limit by those who hold it if no rules framed it. In the past, two principles dominated: the seizure of power and its preservation. It was only with the evolution of societies that another vision emerged, based on the sovereignty of the people, and no longer on the person of the king. From then on, those who aspire to govern can no longer only think of taking and keeping power, but must also consider transmitting it. This idea becomes one of the foundations of democratic societies. It is therefore essential that elective political functions be exercised within a legally defined temporal framework. This duration, fixed in advance, constitutes an institutional convention intended not only to organize political life, but also, to a certain extent, to guarantee the stability of the democratic system.
Except for a few constitutions that grant the head of state power ad vitam aeternam, the supreme magistracy is in principle limited in time: the duration of the presidential term, variable mutatis mutandis according to institutional systems, is fixed by the fundamental law. The same applies to all elective functions, whose temporal limitation constitutes one of the essential safeguards of democracy. But generally, what the constitutional history of Haiti reveals is that at no time have elective terms been standardized around a single duration (See the table below). The duration varied according to the nature of the functions, whether executive, legislative, or local.
CONSTITUTION DEPUTY SENATOR PRESIDENT
Duration Duration Duration
May 20, 1805 Lifetime
December 27, 1806 n/a 9 years 4 years
February 17, 1807 Lifetime
August 4, 1811 Lifetime
June 2, 1816 5 years 9 years Lifetime
December 30, 1843 3 years 6 years 4 years
November 14, 1846 5 years 9 years Lifetime
September 20, 1849 5 years 9 years Empire
June 14, 1867 3 years 6 years 4 years
August 6, 1874 3 years 6 years 8 years
December 18, 1879 5 years 6 years 7 years
December 16, 1888 n/a 7 years
October 9, 1889 3 years 6 years 7 years
June 10, 1918 2 years 6 years 4 years
July 15, 1932 4 years 6 years 6 years
July 2, 1935 4 years 6 years 5 years
November 22, 1946 4 years 6 years 6 years
November 22, 1950 4 years 6 years 6 years
December 22, 1957 6 years 6 years
May 26, 1964 6 years Lifetime
August 27, 1983 6 years Lifetime
March 27, 1987 4 years 6 years 5 years
However, the draft Constitution of 2025 proposes a major break with this tradition by aligning the duration of all elective terms to five years. At first glance, one might argue that this reform aims to simplify the electoral calendar, allowing for only one popular consultation every five years. Such a measure would very likely reduce the costs associated with organizing elections. However, all of this is mere speculation, as the draft has not been accompanied by explanatory comments, which deprives us, citizens, of benchmarks to understand the foundations of certain proposals.
What I do not doubt is that I have serious reservations about this proposal, which could cause much more instability than one might imagine. Is it not, in fact, one of the fundamental objectives of a political regime in a constitution to ensure institutional stability, which alone is capable of creating the conditions for economic and social progress? This is precisely what the 1987 Constitution failed to guarantee, leading the country into a spiral of repeated political crises, to the point of relentlessly wanting its head today.
By aligning the duration of all elective terms to five years, with the supposed main goal of organizing a single national election over this period, one of the major problems this could generate is the excessively long waiting time between two national elections. Given the country's recent political history, I doubt that this proposal would not create more problems than solutions. It didn't take long to launch hostilities against Martelly after his election in 2011. Subsequently, he governed against a backdrop of instability and endless opposition demonstrations. The same goes for Jovenel Moïse who, in 2018, faced his baptism of fire, just one year after taking office.
However, the problem is not so much that political actors are acting in bad faith, but rather that the political system is not organized in such a way as to guarantee stability, and especially to create a place for the losers. In a democracy, one cannot only allow the winners to prevail. There must be a constant and institutionalized cohabitation between losers and winners, because the defeated are called at some point to be losers and the losers, at some point, winners. The stability of a democratic regime rests first and foremost on consensus.
Obviously, elections alone will not be enough to guarantee stability or democratic progress. But they constitute an essential lever. This is precisely why I doubt that Haitian political leaders will have the patience to wait five years after an electoral defeat to return to the arena.
Such a long period without popular consultation, in my opinion, is more likely to foster unrest, or even fuel forms of extra-institutional protest.
And the problem I raise here is not unique to Haiti. It is a consideration that applies — or can apply — to many other countries. This is, moreover, one of the reasons why single elections are rarely adopted in modern democracies.
It is true that it is not easy for us in Haiti, where we have ended up developing a certain dependence on international aid, both due to a lack of expertise and, above all, a lack of financial means. Our elections have always been expensive since the post-1986 period, and we do not have the necessary resources to finance them alone. If the only elections that have been held so far are those of a general nature — presidential, legislative, and local — it is not necessarily because it is the ideal path, but because they have always been perceived as the only possible bulwark after major crises or widespread protests.
It therefore becomes crucial that we establish a true electoral culture in the country. Incidentally, René Préval remains one of the few heads of state to have organized elections within his term — or rather, towards the end. Criticisms against him are numerous, certainly, but this does not prevent recognizing his skill in managing political affairs. Even when he did not organize mid-term elections, he understood the need to change government to inject new dynamism and integrate new actors.
Beyond the criticisms — which it is not useful to repeat here — Préval is one of the most astute Haitian politicians of his generation. He knows the system, and he knows the people. Some might be tempted to compare his style to that of Ariel Henry. But I'll stop there.
To return to our subject, the regular holding of elections helps to anchor an electoral culture and also helps to ease the political climate, by offering citizens periodic opportunities to express themselves.
Without going far, let's take the example of the United States. Indeed, in Uncle Sam's country, mid-term elections play a central role in the stability of the system, allowing the people to readjust the balance of power during the term, without having to wait for the next presidential election.
I have also observed an almost similar dynamic in Taiwan, where local elections fulfill this function. The presidential term being four years, local elections are held in the second year, with the understanding, as I was made to understand, of giving the population the opportunity to express their support or disagreement with the central power, without disrupting the entire political architecture.
Instead, I would rather favor a four-year presidential term, renewable only once, a six-year senatorial term, a four-year deputy term, as well as a four-year term for mayors, governors, and members of communal assemblies. Local and regional elections would then serve as mid-terms, which, in my opinion, is essential in any presidential system. It is always important for the people to have the opportunity to express themselves during the cycle.
Another element that seems crucial to me to take into account — in light of the abuses observed over the last thirty-eight years — is the question of the revocability of the parliamentary mandate. Without going as far as an imperative mandate, I believe it is time to consider a clear, framed, democratic mechanism allowing the population to revoke an elected official if they believe they have been betrayed. A large part of our elected officials have strayed from their mission, going so far as to openly despise the people.
In conclusion, I would clearly say that the term model proposed in the Draft Constitution, if adopted as is, risks leading us straight to a new impasse. It corresponds neither to our constitutional history nor to the demands for stability that the current situation imposes. However, today, the country's most urgent need is precisely stability. Any proposal that ignores it risks missing its target.
Power, with all the privileges it implies, would be exercised without limit by those who hold it if no rules framed it. In the past, two principles dominated: the seizure of power and its preservation. It was only with the evolution of societies that another vision emerged, based on the sovereignty of the people, and no longer on the person of the king. From then on, those who aspire to govern can no longer only think of taking and keeping power, but must also consider transmitting it. This idea becomes one of the foundations of democratic societies. It is therefore essential that elective political functions be exercised within a legally defined temporal framework. This duration, fixed in advance, constitutes an institutional convention intended not only to organize political life, but also, to a certain extent, to guarantee the stability of the democratic system.
Except for a few constitutions that grant the head of state power ad vitam aeternam, the supreme magistracy is in principle limited in time: the duration of the presidential term, variable mutatis mutandis according to institutional systems, is fixed by the fundamental law. The same applies to all elective functions, whose temporal limitation constitutes one of the essential safeguards of democracy. But generally, what the constitutional history of Haiti reveals is that at no time have elective terms been standardized around a single duration (See the table below). The duration varied according to the nature of the functions, whether executive, legislative, or local.
CONSTITUTION DEPUTY SENATOR PRESIDENT
Duration Duration Duration
May 20, 1805 Lifetime
December 27, 1806 n/a 9 years 4 years
February 17, 1807 Lifetime
August 4, 1811 Lifetime
June 2, 1816 5 years 9 years Lifetime
December 30, 1843 3 years 6 years 4 years
November 14, 1846 5 years 9 years Lifetime
September 20, 1849 5 years 9 years Empire
June 14, 1867 3 years 6 years 4 years
August 6, 1874 3 years 6 years 8 years
December 18, 1879 5 years 6 years 7 years
December 16, 1888 n/a 7 years
October 9, 1889 3 years 6 years 7 years
June 10, 1918 2 years 6 years 4 years
July 15, 1932 4 years 6 years 6 years
July 2, 1935 4 years 6 years 5 years
November 22, 1946 4 years 6 years 6 years
November 22, 1950 4 years 6 years 6 years
December 22, 1957 6 years 6 years
May 26, 1964 6 years Lifetime
August 27, 1983 6 years Lifetime
March 27, 1987 4 years 6 years 5 years
However, the draft Constitution of 2025 proposes a major break with this tradition by aligning the duration of all elective terms to five years. At first glance, one might argue that this reform aims to simplify the electoral calendar, allowing for only one popular consultation every five years. Such a measure would very likely reduce the costs associated with organizing elections. However, all of this is mere speculation, as the draft has not been accompanied by explanatory comments, which deprives us, citizens, of benchmarks to understand the foundations of certain proposals.
What I do not doubt is that I have serious reservations about this proposal, which could cause much more instability than one might imagine. Is it not, in fact, one of the fundamental objectives of a political regime in a constitution to ensure institutional stability, which alone is capable of creating the conditions for economic and social progress? This is precisely what the 1987 Constitution failed to guarantee, leading the country into a spiral of repeated political crises, to the point of relentlessly wanting its head today.
By aligning the duration of all elective terms to five years, with the supposed main goal of organizing a single national election over this period, one of the major problems this could generate is the excessively long waiting time between two national elections. Given the country's recent political history, I doubt that this proposal would not create more problems than solutions. It didn't take long to launch hostilities against Martelly after his election in 2011. Subsequently, he governed against a backdrop of instability and endless opposition demonstrations. The same goes for Jovenel Moïse who, in 2018, faced his baptism of fire, just one year after taking office.
However, the problem is not so much that political actors are acting in bad faith, but rather that the political system is not organized in such a way as to guarantee stability, and especially to create a place for the losers. In a democracy, one cannot only allow the winners to prevail. There must be a constant and institutionalized cohabitation between losers and winners, because the defeated are called at some point to be losers and the losers, at some point, winners. The stability of a democratic regime rests first and foremost on consensus.
Obviously, elections alone will not be enough to guarantee stability or democratic progress. But they constitute an essential lever. This is precisely why I doubt that Haitian political leaders will have the patience to wait five years after an electoral defeat to return to the arena.
Such a long period without popular consultation, in my opinion, is more likely to foster unrest, or even fuel forms of extra-institutional protest.
And the problem I raise here is not unique to Haiti. It is a consideration that applies — or can apply — to many other countries. This is, moreover, one of the reasons why single elections are rarely adopted in modern democracies.
It is true that it is not easy for us in Haiti, where we have ended up developing a certain dependence on international aid, both due to a lack of expertise and, above all, a lack of financial means. Our elections have always been expensive since the post-1986 period, and we do not have the necessary resources to finance them alone. If the only elections that have been held so far are those of a general nature — presidential, legislative, and local — it is not necessarily because it is the ideal path, but because they have always been perceived as the only possible bulwark after major crises or widespread protests.
It therefore becomes crucial that we establish a true electoral culture in the country. Incidentally, René Préval remains one of the few heads of state to have organized elections within his term — or rather, towards the end. Criticisms against him are numerous, certainly, but this does not prevent recognizing his skill in managing political affairs. Even when he did not organize mid-term elections, he understood the need to change government to inject new dynamism and integrate new actors.
Beyond the criticisms — which it is not useful to repeat here — Préval is one of the most astute Haitian politicians of his generation. He knows the system, and he knows the people. Some might be tempted to compare his style to that of Ariel Henry. But I'll stop there.
To return to our subject, the regular holding of elections helps to anchor an electoral culture and also helps to ease the political climate, by offering citizens periodic opportunities to express themselves.
Without going far, let's take the example of the United States. Indeed, in Uncle Sam's country, mid-term elections play a central role in the stability of the system, allowing the people to readjust the balance of power during the term, without having to wait for the next presidential election.
I have also observed an almost similar dynamic in Taiwan, where local elections fulfill this function. The presidential term being four years, local elections are held in the second year, with the understanding, as I was made to understand, of giving the population the opportunity to express their support or disagreement with the central power, without disrupting the entire political architecture.
Instead, I would rather favor a four-year presidential term, renewable only once, a six-year senatorial term, a four-year deputy term, as well as a four-year term for mayors, governors, and members of communal assemblies. Local and regional elections would then serve as mid-terms, which, in my opinion, is essential in any presidential system. It is always important for the people to have the opportunity to express themselves during the cycle.
Another element that seems crucial to me to take into account — in light of the abuses observed over the last thirty-eight years — is the question of the revocability of the parliamentary mandate. Without going as far as an imperative mandate, I believe it is time to consider a clear, framed, democratic mechanism allowing the population to revoke an elected official if they believe they have been betrayed. A large part of our elected officials have strayed from their mission, going so far as to openly despise the people.
In conclusion, I would clearly say that the term model proposed in the Draft Constitution, if adopted as is, risks leading us straight to a new impasse. It corresponds neither to our constitutional history nor to the demands for stability that the current situation imposes. However, today, the country's most urgent need is precisely stability. Any proposal that ignores it risks missing its target.
