Haiti: The April 3 agreement and the missteps of a derailed transition

The forced resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry, held outside the national territory amidst insecurity and institutional paralysis, has opened a new political chapter in Haiti. In an urgent situation and under internal and international pressure, representatives from six political, economic, social, and religious sectors (Montana agreement, December 21 agreement, Pitit Dessalines, RED/EDE/Historic Compromise /REN/Inter Foi, civil society group) concluded a political agreement aimed at establishing a peaceful and orderly transition. This agreement gave birth to a bicameral executive composed of a Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) and a transitional government. I. Architecture and ambitions of the April 3, 2024 agreement The political agreement, structured into 16 sections and 53 articles, was signed by 23 political figures representing six blocs or six sectors. These signatories established a Transitional Presidential Council composed of 9 members: 7 voting advisors and 2 observers, tasked with guiding the transition and appointing a government with three major priorities: restoring security, launching constitutional and institutional reforms, and organizing general, credible, and democratic elections. In essence, it was about restoring the functionality of the State, rebuilding citizen trust, and creating the conditions for a return to constitutional order. II. Structural failures of the CPT with regard to the April 3 agreement Since its official installation on April 24, 2024, the CPT has accumulated significant breaches of the very provisions of the agreement that established it. Several essential provisions have not been respected, compromising the legitimacy and effectiveness of the process.

1. The adoption of rotating presidency, an initial violation of Article 4.1

The unilateral adoption of a rotating presidency, not provided for by Article 4.1, introduced functional instability, fueling internal rivalries and decision-making blockages. This initial deviation symbolized the deficit of institutional coherence and discipline that would characterize the Council's entire operation.

2. The absence of transitional institutions provided for by the agreement

Several cardinal structures have never been established, notably: the Governmental Action Control Body (OCAG) in accordance with Article 2, the National Security Council (Arts. 25 to 27), the Specialized National Financial Prosecutor's Office (Art. 39), and the Truth, Justice, and Reparation Commission (Art. 40)
These bodies were nevertheless essential for overseeing executive action, strengthening the fight against corruption, defining a coherent security policy, and initiating a transitional justice process.

3. The electoralist temptation: a violation of Article 49

Article 49 explicitly stipulates that members of the CPT and the transitional government cannot seek a mandate in the next elections. However, some ministers, particularly from the CPT/Conille government, are already signaling electoral ambitions, which contravenes not only the agreement but also the spirit of ethical neutrality that should guide any transition. III. The overall failure of the transitional mission: diagnosis and scope According to Article 12.1 of the April 3, 2024 agreement, the CPT's mandate, which officially began on April 24, 2024, will end on February 7, 2026, with no possibility of extension (Art. 13). Despite this clear deadline, the Council belatedly took the initiative to steer the transition towards elections, without having met the minimum conditions for security, institutional governance, or social legitimacy. Today, a consensus is emerging within society: the population, the sectors that appointed the advisors, and even several CPT members implicitly or explicitly recognize that the transitional body has failed in its mission. Strategic incoherence, the absence of accountability mechanisms, the personalization of functions, and the profound disconnect between the agreement's obligations and daily practice have transformed this transition into an exercise in political impotence. IV. A drifting transition The CPT's missteps, with regard to the April 3, 2024 agreement, result from the inability of an ambitious political mechanism to comply with the standards it had set for itself. More than a mere administrative failure, it is a conceptual failure: the CPT has neither consolidated the State, nor restored security, nor organized elections, nor validated or popularized the draft new constitution developed by the steering committee it had itself created, a process that nevertheless cost the State several million gourdes. Ultimately, the gap between the letter of the agreement and its implementation reflects a deeper crisis: that of governability in Haiti, where political arrangements born of fragile compromises struggle to transform into effective institutions. The challenge ahead will be not only to secure the country but also to organize elections and rebuild an institutional framework capable of avoiding the repetition of the same impasses. Pierre Josué Agénor Cadet