The Sino-American Couple: Rivalry or Thucydides Trap?

The recent visit of US President Donald Trump to the 'Middle Kingdom,' China, marks a turning point in relations between the two superpowers. Since the famous work of American professor Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, published after the end of the Cold War, marked by the strategic victory of the Americans and the absence of a true rival, the United States had established itself as the world's policeman. Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping's China was building a new power through ambitious economic reforms.

Since September 11, 2001, Uncle Sam has become bogged down in several very costly wars such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria to a lesser extent. Since at that time the Americans dominated the world both by their financial and technological power and their way of life, they could dictate their will to the rest of the world. However, from 2010 onward, the People's Republic of China has been climbing the slope at breakneck speed, and the Middle Kingdom was catching up with the West. Long considered the world's low-end workshop, in less than 20 years, China has surpassed the West in various sectors such as automotive, engineering, and nanotechnology.

The visit of US President Donald Trump marks a major turning point in Sino-American relations. The Trump administration favors a strategy based on tariff diplomacy toward major economic powers, particularly China. However, now aware of its power, China intends to respond firmly to American pressure.

The world's largest consumer economy, a country with one of the largest savings reserves, and a leader in the highly strategic rare earth sector—essential for manufacturing cutting-edge technology, modern weaponry, and artificial intelligence systems—China has adopted several countermeasures against the United States. Beijing has notably restricted access to its market for certain American companies and imposed limitations on the export of strategic minerals.

At the same time, China seeks to assert itself more on the international stage as a stabilizing power, defending an alternative model to that of 'Uncle Sam.' The 'Middle Kingdom' thus attempts to project the image of an actor favorable to multilateralism, economic cooperation, and a world order less dominated by the United States.

After what Caracas describes as the 'kidnapping' of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by the United States during the American operation of January 2026, China suffered a major strategic shock. Several international media reported that Washington captured Maduro during a controversial military operation, denounced by Caracas as a violation of international law.

Al Jazeera

Venezuela was indeed one of China's main suppliers of cheap oil. As the world's leading manufacturing power and 'workshop of the world,' Beijing has colossal and constant energy needs. In this logic, the war between the Americans and Israelis against Iran was also perceived by Chinese strategists as a direct threat to their energy and geopolitical interests.

According to several geopolitical analyses, Beijing then discreetly strengthened its support for Tehran, notably through intelligence sharing, dual-use technologies, and indirect diplomatic backing. China also reportedly played a discreet but crucial role in some difficult negotiations between Iranians and Americans, primarily seeking to avoid a major destabilization of the Middle East that could disrupt its energy supplies and the global economic balance.

The visit of US President Donald Trump to China has, for many observers, illustrated the evolution of the power balance between the two powers. The image projected by Chinese President Xi Jinping, combined with Donald Trump's more cautious posture during negotiations, reinforced the idea of a global strategic rebalancing where the United States can no longer unilaterally impose its will as it did after the Cold War.

In this context, Xi Jinping's evocation of the 'Thucydides Trap' carries major symbolic weight. This concept, popularized by American professor Graham Allison in his book Destined for War, describes the risk of conflict when an emerging power catches up with a dominant power. Studying sixteen historical cases, Graham Allison estimates that twelve of them led to armed confrontations, ranging from the rivalry of the Peloponnesian War in antiquity to tensions between the German Empire and the British Empire on the eve of World War I.

Furthermore, one of the major pillars of American soft power, namely the dominance of the dollar, seems to be gradually eroding under the effect of global geo-economic reconfigurations. Powers like China now seek to reduce their dependence on the US-dominated financial system, notably through trade in local currencies, the development of BRICS, and the creation of alternative financial mechanisms. Beijing thus increasingly projects itself as a credible contender for the top spot in the 21st-century international order.

Wilfrid Joseph