Should the Haitian Population Be Militarized in the Face of the Terrors of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif?

By Jean Venel Casséus The question arises, and the idea is gaining serious traction in certain circles, fueled by a sense of abandonment and growing fear. Recently, a senior official of the Haitian National Police, regularly sought after by the media and universities, declared on Twitter: “Grant everyone the right to possess weapons.” In another message, referring to Port-au-Prince, he added: “… If the State does not have the means to protect these neighborhoods, it must supervise these Vigilance Committees via a Civil Defense strategy to prevent passion from leading to abuses.” Presented as a response to the failure of institutions, these declarations, like other recent stances in security circles, suggest a move towards the militarization of the population, perceived as a last resort against the terrorists of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif, among others. However, before any analysis on this subject, it must be recalled that the right to possess a weapon for one's own protection is already guaranteed by the Haitian Constitution. Article 268-1 of the amended 1987 Constitution specifies: “Every citizen has the right to carry a handgun for their own defense, with authorization from the competent authority.” This constitutional right should therefore not be confused with a general legalization of the possession of war weapons nor with a systematic militarization of society. It is regulated, subject to authorization, and limited to an individual purpose: personal protection. If we assume, in good faith, that the author of the tweet is aware of this provision, then their call probably aims to broaden this right to include war weapons. However, such a direction requires fundamental clarifications to avoid any conceptual confusion and any chaotic public defense policy. Civil defense refers to a set of non-military actions undertaken by citizens or institutions to protect civilian populations in times of crisis: natural disasters, armed attacks, or any other emergency situation. It mobilizes skills in community organization, emergency relief, evacuation, and securing public spaces, without resorting to the use of lethal force. Military defense, conversely, falls under the strategy, organization, and deployment of a state's armed forces to respond to internal or external armed threats. It adheres to a strict hierarchical logic, sustained training, and a doctrine for the use of weapons framed by national and international rules. Popular self-defense, often embodied by neighborhood brigades, lies at the border between these two models. These groups, born out of the necessity to fill the security vacuum left by the State, arm themselves to protect their community. However, due to a lack of adequate training, supervision, and integration into a clear legal framework, these initiatives frequently devolve into abuses, even atrocities comparable to those of the groups they claim to combat. What would happen, then, if the Haitian State officially decided to militarize its population? In the short term, a resurgence of violence can be expected: in a country without a reliable arms registry, where the State already struggles to control illicit flows, such a measure would risk strengthening criminal networks under the guise of legality. Inter-community conflicts could explode, with armed groups multiplying under the pretext of self-defense. In the medium term, a society where every citizen is potentially armed becomes extremely difficult to govern. The confusion between legitimate authority and de facto authority would intensify. The State would further lose its monopoly on legitimate violence, the foundation of all sovereignty. Trust between citizens would erode, replaced by a culture of suspicion, preemptive armament, and retaliation. In the long term, there would be a risk of a definitive collapse of the very idea of a nation. For what binds a society together is not the individual capacity to defend oneself, but the collective awareness that a common framework — institutional, legal, political — ensures the security of all. However, massively arming a population without a rule of law amounts to institutionalizing anarchy. This would be the ultimate failure of the Haitian State: its renunciation of ensuring the protection of its citizens, transferred to each according to their means, fears, and reflexes. Therefore, from my point of view, what Haiti needs today to recover from its chaos is not an armed populace, but a strong, just, present, and responsible State, equipped with a reformed, non-politicized army; a strengthened, equipped, and respected police force; a public defense and security policy based on intelligence, prevention, and legitimacy; and intelligent and respectable diplomacy. The militarization of the population would only substitute the violence of gangs with that of desperate crowds. Both have the same roots: abandonment. And only institutional reconstruction can address this sustainably. May 7, 2025