The Draft Constitution Advocates a Return to All-Powerful Presidentialism
For about three decades, it has been repeatedly stated in political, academic, and Western diplomatic circles in Haiti that the Constitution is the primary source of the country's political instability. According to them, it is responsible for serious governance problems. If schools or roads are not built, it is its fault.
By La Rédaction · Port-au-Prince
· 7 min read · Updated 24 April 2026
Translated from French — AI-assisted and reviewed by the editorial team. The French version is authoritative. Read the original · About our translation policy
For about three decades, not a day goes by without it being repeated in political, academic, and Western diplomatic circles in Haiti that the Constitution is the main source of the country's political instability. According to them, it is responsible for serious governance problems. If schools or roads are not built, it is its fault.
These academics and politicians — both left and right — trained in the school of the autocratic and personal power of the Duvaliers, summarize this alleged source of instability as follows: the President of the Republic, during an election campaign, makes promises to the population. But once elected, he encounters a disappointing reality: he does not hold real power.
The real levers would lie in the hands of a Prime Minister, whether from a parliamentary majority or not, depending on the reality of the Chambers. Thus, even before taking the reins of power, this elected president finds himself in a situation of political anxiety facing the future head of government, who emanates from his authority but cannot be revoked by him, which makes any collaboration difficult from the outset between the two heads of the executive.
Since then, politicians and academics have proposed transforming this reality by strengthening the powers of the president, to the detriment of other institutions, particularly Parliament, which they deem too powerful, and especially guilty of hindering the «benevolent actions of the president for the benefit of the population».
Contrary to the old project which is no longer to be held, the draft constitution thus pursues two major objectives: to inflate the prerogatives of the president by eliminating all control mechanisms over the executive, and to weaken Parliament as much as possible. This is the new reality being proposed to us, ending the old one deemed too destabilizing for the proper functioning of the State. But, as Spinoza wrote: how can one want to change a reality one does not understand?
I do not claim to possess the truth, like Professor Gracien Jean, who spends an entire night crying because he is unable to bear the consequences of a rigorous scientific debate on the draft constitution he is tasked with defending, against all odds. This, to satisfy the whims of a de facto power in decline, devoid of all governmental ethics.
These tears shed for a poorly crafted work, whose implementation will be presented to the people — ordered to accept it by a referendum in the manner of Roger Lafontant for a «yes» massive — would have human meaning if his emotions were directed towards the thousands of citizens who are exhausted and at their wits' end.
Emotions, like manipulations, let alone media maneuvers to ensure a certain legitimacy for the approach, will change nothing in the conception of the text submitted to citizens' criticism. All of this constitutes epistemological obstacles to the conditions of a scientifically well-conducted work, to repeat Gaston Bachelard.
When the intellectual, in search of knowledge, encounters a truth, he reinvents himself by questioning what he believes he knows, to unlearn in order to relearn, as Descartes said.
The Bicephalous System Under Attack
A journalist once asked Leslie Manigat: «How do you intend to govern the country, since the 1987 Constitution granted no power to the president?» He replied: «The President of the Republic holds real powers; it is simply a matter of knowing how to exercise them.» Perhaps my own understanding of presidential power, as enshrined in this Constitution, is also subject to error — like that of the former president. My article aims to deconstruct this certainty that the president elected under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution would be «naked as a worm,» dispossessed of all real power. It is precisely from this received idea that the steering committee, established as a constituent assembly, felt authorized to inflate the powers of the President of the Republic in the draft new Constitution. The 1987 Constitution established a bicephalous governance: the President of the Republic, head of state, and the Prime Minister, head of government, whose main mission is to coordinate governmental activities. In this remarkable system, the Prime Minister acts as a counterweight to the President of the Republic. It is not a mechanism intended to block the functioning of the executive power, but rather a device that encourages permanent dialogue between the two heads of the executive, serving the proper functioning of the State. This is the principle of power balancing: an exercise in which each actor plays a role of relative importance in the decision-making process. Concretely, the President of the Republic exercises significant powers. It is he who designates the Prime Minister, even when the latter comes from a majority party. The Prime Minister alone cannot form the ministerial cabinet. He thus finds himself in a situation of cohabitation, where two political visions must coexist within the government. Diplomacy remains the President's preserve: it is he who appoints, after Senate ratification, ambassadors and consuls general. Although the Prime Minister is the head of public administration, it is the President who appoints general directors, delegates, and vice-delegates. The appointment of the commander-in-chief of the army and the police also falls under presidential authority. Members of bank boards are chosen by the President, even if their appointment requires Senate ratification. Finally, it is the President of the Republic who presides over the Council of Ministers, the highest political body in the country. An Emasculated Prime Minister
The 1987 Constitution designates the Prime Minister as head of the administration, which includes all public officials — the institutional space par excellence where governors implement public policies. He is also the head of the Superior Council of the Haitian National Police (CSPN). He is the sole authority vested with the power to appoint and revoke in public administration. However, he has no authority over the administration of Parliament or that of Justice. Finally, the Prime Minister countersigns the President's acts, which demonstrates his responsibility in their execution. In case of presidential vacancy, he serves as interim until the election of a new President, in accordance with the amended text. In the draft Constitution, the position of Prime Minister is a comedy, a mere façade. This function is completely stripped of its substance. He assists the President, who can, if he wishes, entrust him with a few tasks to accomplish. It is, in reality, a disguised vice-president, integrated into a presidential regime that does not fully embrace its nature. The President can revoke him at will and replace him with another minister. This Prime Minister is not subject to parliamentary control. We are thus faced with a regime where the President concentrates the functions of head of state and head of government. Why then conceal the true nature of the regime one seeks to impose on the country? Why make it unrecognizable, almost invisible? A Prime Minister integrated into a presidential regime, characterized by the principle of strict separation of powers: this is a Haitian novelty that should be seriously questioned. Especially since this draft, which claims to harmonize mandates, stipulates that in the event of a legislative vacuum, the executive power shall be authorized to make laws. This is a true right of dissolution, subtly slipped in for the benefit of the President of the Republic, under the pretext of correcting a deviation, it announces the forceful return of the new Haitian dictator, to repeat Frantz Duval. By conferring such power on the President, in a vague and imprecise manner — thus conducive to conflicts — the balance of powers is broken. Presidential hegemony now imposes itself on Parliament. Is this how one claims to rationalize the presidential regime? What an absurdity! Faced with such foolishness, Dr. Gracien Jean, there is truly cause for tears. One must weep for men in their foolishness. I look at you, and I pity you, because I see an unhappy nation, plagued by both moral and intellectual distress. Like Catherine Corsini in La Fracture, we must weep for the nation. Weep one last time, until there is not a single tear left to shed. At this stage of collective despair, sincere tears, swollen with revolt, could transform into a powerful torrent, capable of shaking numb consciences. From this citizen awakening, perhaps the vital impulse necessary for the nation to take shape and regain its breath will finally emerge. Sonet Saint-Louis, Esq.
Professor of Constitutional Law and Methodology at the Faculty of Law and Economics of the State University of Haiti
Professor of Philosophy
Under the bamboos,
La Gonave, May 27, 2025 Contribution from Cabinet Le Prétoire
Law firm involved in the ongoing constitutional debate
A journalist once asked Leslie Manigat: «How do you intend to govern the country, since the 1987 Constitution granted no power to the president?» He replied: «The President of the Republic holds real powers; it is simply a matter of knowing how to exercise them.» Perhaps my own understanding of presidential power, as enshrined in this Constitution, is also subject to error — like that of the former president. My article aims to deconstruct this certainty that the president elected under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution would be «naked as a worm,» dispossessed of all real power. It is precisely from this received idea that the steering committee, established as a constituent assembly, felt authorized to inflate the powers of the President of the Republic in the draft new Constitution. The 1987 Constitution established a bicephalous governance: the President of the Republic, head of state, and the Prime Minister, head of government, whose main mission is to coordinate governmental activities. In this remarkable system, the Prime Minister acts as a counterweight to the President of the Republic. It is not a mechanism intended to block the functioning of the executive power, but rather a device that encourages permanent dialogue between the two heads of the executive, serving the proper functioning of the State. This is the principle of power balancing: an exercise in which each actor plays a role of relative importance in the decision-making process. Concretely, the President of the Republic exercises significant powers. It is he who designates the Prime Minister, even when the latter comes from a majority party. The Prime Minister alone cannot form the ministerial cabinet. He thus finds himself in a situation of cohabitation, where two political visions must coexist within the government. Diplomacy remains the President's preserve: it is he who appoints, after Senate ratification, ambassadors and consuls general. Although the Prime Minister is the head of public administration, it is the President who appoints general directors, delegates, and vice-delegates. The appointment of the commander-in-chief of the army and the police also falls under presidential authority. Members of bank boards are chosen by the President, even if their appointment requires Senate ratification. Finally, it is the President of the Republic who presides over the Council of Ministers, the highest political body in the country. An Emasculated Prime Minister
The 1987 Constitution designates the Prime Minister as head of the administration, which includes all public officials — the institutional space par excellence where governors implement public policies. He is also the head of the Superior Council of the Haitian National Police (CSPN). He is the sole authority vested with the power to appoint and revoke in public administration. However, he has no authority over the administration of Parliament or that of Justice. Finally, the Prime Minister countersigns the President's acts, which demonstrates his responsibility in their execution. In case of presidential vacancy, he serves as interim until the election of a new President, in accordance with the amended text. In the draft Constitution, the position of Prime Minister is a comedy, a mere façade. This function is completely stripped of its substance. He assists the President, who can, if he wishes, entrust him with a few tasks to accomplish. It is, in reality, a disguised vice-president, integrated into a presidential regime that does not fully embrace its nature. The President can revoke him at will and replace him with another minister. This Prime Minister is not subject to parliamentary control. We are thus faced with a regime where the President concentrates the functions of head of state and head of government. Why then conceal the true nature of the regime one seeks to impose on the country? Why make it unrecognizable, almost invisible? A Prime Minister integrated into a presidential regime, characterized by the principle of strict separation of powers: this is a Haitian novelty that should be seriously questioned. Especially since this draft, which claims to harmonize mandates, stipulates that in the event of a legislative vacuum, the executive power shall be authorized to make laws. This is a true right of dissolution, subtly slipped in for the benefit of the President of the Republic, under the pretext of correcting a deviation, it announces the forceful return of the new Haitian dictator, to repeat Frantz Duval. By conferring such power on the President, in a vague and imprecise manner — thus conducive to conflicts — the balance of powers is broken. Presidential hegemony now imposes itself on Parliament. Is this how one claims to rationalize the presidential regime? What an absurdity! Faced with such foolishness, Dr. Gracien Jean, there is truly cause for tears. One must weep for men in their foolishness. I look at you, and I pity you, because I see an unhappy nation, plagued by both moral and intellectual distress. Like Catherine Corsini in La Fracture, we must weep for the nation. Weep one last time, until there is not a single tear left to shed. At this stage of collective despair, sincere tears, swollen with revolt, could transform into a powerful torrent, capable of shaking numb consciences. From this citizen awakening, perhaps the vital impulse necessary for the nation to take shape and regain its breath will finally emerge. Sonet Saint-Louis, Esq.
Professor of Constitutional Law and Methodology at the Faculty of Law and Economics of the State University of Haiti
Professor of Philosophy
Under the bamboos,
La Gonave, May 27, 2025 Contribution from Cabinet Le Prétoire
Law firm involved in the ongoing constitutional debate
