Introduction
In an article published on May 23, 2025, in the online newspaper Nòdwès Info, I argued that the draft constitution prepared by the steering committee was undeniably illegitimate, not very credible, but not entirely inconsistent. It was therefore clear to me that the enormity and, above all, the nature of its weaknesses made it unacceptable.
Indeed, the consultations and departmental meetings were a fiasco, the draft a disappointment, and the referendum decree a provocation. The majority of the most representative political parties and civil society organizations do not often intervene in public debates to openly challenge the referendum process. But, well before, they had already expressed their opposition to the referendum process in the responsive letter they had sent to the coordinator of the working group on the constitution.
In these correspondences, also published in the official report of the GTC, they had declined his invitation to take part in the consultations he conducted as part of the preparatory work for the new constitution.
The minutes of the preparatory work should have, in principle, also been published in the country's official gazette, but shrewdly, the CPT did not publish them to try to distort history and conceal the traces of this ambush, this crime against democracy. However, they were formally recorded in the GTC report, which nevertheless gives them an authentic character.
It is therefore with great astonishment that I learned of the referendum decree published by the Transitional Presidential Council in the Monitor of July 3, 2025, special No. 45. Through this unilateral administrative act, the CPT officially acknowledges the inconsistency of the draft constitution, reinforces its illegitimacy, and confirms the unsuitability of the referendum process.
The socio-political context in which the referendum decree of July 3, 2025, is published is ill-chosen.
Without going into the technical details relating to the democratic foundation of the process, the respect for relevant legal texts, the credibility of the bodies responsible for implementing it, the non-existence of a constituent assembly, and the technical shortcomings of the draft constitution, the failure of the consultations and departmental meetings organized respectively by the GTC and the steering committee are sufficient reasons to indicate to the CPT that it should have temporarily suspended the referendum process to re-evaluate it instead of publishing a decree aimed at concretizing it.
Analyzing the referendum decree issued by the CPT, the first thing that caught my attention is the close proximity between its publication date and the deadline given to citizens to submit their potential grievances against the draft constitution, which was also published in the country's official gazette.
Indeed, the steering committee had set June 25 as the deadline for receiving criticisms, remarks, and suggestions from citizens. Whereas the referendum decree was officially published in the official gazette <
> on July 3, 2024.
By publishing this decree, the steering committee and the Transitional Presidential Council announce that the changes they intend to make to the draft constitution proposed by the steering committee would only be minor modifications that are not likely to challenge its philosophy and main orientations.
The publication of the referendum decree reinforces the suspicions already raised by public conflicts and disputes that affected not only the relations of the country's organized sectors with the CPT and the bodies responsible for conducting the process, but also those between the latter themselves.
While it is true that in my publications and media interventions I have not always emphasized the negative impacts of the lack of material conditions related to security, the technical planning of the referendum process, and the psycho-sociological conditioning of the population on the process, it is nonetheless true that they are essential and, therefore, should not be neglected.
To date, armed gangs continue to control more than 80 percent of the capital, a large part of the Artibonite department, and also a part of the center. The political atmosphere that prevailed among the various actors who signed the April 3, 2024 agreement and who brought the CPT into being has disappeared.
Great uncertainty inhabits the minds of citizens regarding the future of the country and that of the CPT. This calls into question not only its credibility and legitimacy but also its ability to engage the country in a reform so complicated and so fraught with consequences for the transition and the future of the democratic process.
All in all, this referendum decree comes in a socio-political context where the country is increasingly moving away from the momentum that had justified the timeliness of the referendum process. It is therefore appropriate to objectively analyze its content to get a clearer idea of its real motivations.
Synthetic analysis of the content of the referendum decree and its arbitrary nature
For truth and for history, it is important to emphasize that the referendum decree is signed by all members of the CPT and all those in the government. There is therefore a certain convergence of views on the part of all those who currently govern the country, both on the technical consistency of the draft constitution, its legitimacy, and its timeliness.
The signing of the referendum decree by all members of the government reveals a blatant contradiction between the position expressed by political parties in the letter they addressed to the coordinator of the working group on the constitution, their silence in the media, and their position in the Council of Ministers.
Indeed, this decree comprises twenty-six (26) preambular clauses, five (5) recitals, one hundred and twenty-four (124) articles, divided into ten (10) chapters, and final provisions. The texts referred to are of national and international origin, which constitutes a serious technical error.
Indeed, once declarations of rights such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Haiti's Act of Independence were referred to, it was not necessary to separately cite international instruments signed and ratified by the Haitian State.
Furthermore, the CPT referred to texts adopted during the transition, such as the decree of April 10, 2024, establishing the CPT, the decree of May 23, 2024, determining the organization and operating mode of the CPT, and the decree of July 17, 2024, establishing the creation, organization, and functioning of the national conference.
It also referred to the referendum decree of July 3, 2021, published by Jovenel Moise, 3 days before his assassination on the night of July 6-7, 2021. You will have noticed, therefore, that by a plausible coincidence, both the CPT's referendum decree and Jovenel's were published on July 3. One was published on July 3, 2025, and the other on July 3, 2021.
On the other hand, the CPT avoided referring to the April 3, 2024 agreement and the amended constitution of March 29, 1987. Such an omission is not innocent. It deserves to be scrutinized to better appreciate its meaning and scope.
The analysis of this document reveals that it is not merely a simple coincidence of dates that links the two referendum decrees. In terms of content, the 2025 referendum decree is practically the same as the one adopted by Jovenel in 2021. They have almost the same articles, the same formulations, the same structures, and are subject to the same challenges.
The only real difference between the decree of July 3, 2025, and that of July 3, 2021, is that the former contains nine (9) chapters, while the latter contains ten (10). The CPT added a tenth chapter dealing with challenges, despite the fact that both texts already had one dealing with offenses.
The boundary between these two chapters, which would justify their separation, is not very clear. This legislative inconsistency once again reveals the technical weaknesses of this decree. As paradoxical as it may seem, the CPT does not consider challenging the results of the constitutional referendum an offense. However, it prohibits it without specifying the penalty that would be applied against all those who would be guilty of such an act.
By adding the chapter on consultations, the Transitional Presidential Council implicitly intends to prevent members of all these political parties, civil society organizations, and all these intellectuals and men who oppose the referendum process from criticizing it.
Is this a measure of deterrence or intimidation?
Furthermore, chapters I to XI deal with issues related to the registration assembly and referendum lists, the electoral campaign, the ballot, the observation of the constitutional referendum, the tabulation of votes, the publication of the constitutional referendum results in the official gazette <>, and offenses against the referendum decree.
The objective of the referendum decree of July 3, 2025, as specified in Article 1, is to establish the rules relating to the 2025 referendum. From a legislative perspective, the wording of such an article contains an excess of conciseness. It is evasive and deserves to be completed.
Quite rightly, this is what the fourth recital proposes to do, by specifying that the objective of the referendum decree is to establish the rules relating to the planning, organization, and control of the referendum, as well as the publication of the results.
The content of these two formulations still constitutes a serious legislative error. What should have been written in the recitals is included in the operative part. In general, the former evokes the reasons and objectives of the law, while the latter provides the ways and means by which they are to be achieved.
The sanctions established against several types of disruptions to the referendum process already existed in the 2021 referendum decree, but there was no chapter specifically reserved for challenges. Evidently, the CPT is more concerned with prohibiting challenges to the results of the constitutional referendum than with strengthening the legitimacy of the process to limit or prevent them.
Strangely, the CPT allows campaigning against the draft new constitution before voting operations. However, once adopted, it cannot be challenged by either the population or the members of the CPT. This is not a hypothesis.
Indeed, Article 16 specifies that: « the campaign for or against the draft constitution is permitted ». For its part, Article 88 states that « the result of the constitutional referendum, proclaimed by the CEP and transmitted for publication, cannot be subject to any challenge or objection. Its publication by the executive is automatic and immediate ».
In addition to the vague nature of the legal reasons justifying the addition of the chapter dealing with challenges and its dissociation from the one dealing with offenses, the legal and democratic basis of Article 88 must be analyzed.
Article 88 concerning challenges is arbitrary. It constitutes a clear violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights protection instruments referred to by the decree, of ideological pluralism, freedom of expression, and the political rights of citizens.
Was it not Voltaire who again highlighted the importance of tolerance for democracy by uttering a sublime phrase that would serve as the basis for ideological pluralism? He said this:
« I do not share your opinion, but I am ready to sacrifice myself so that you have the possibility to express it. »
Indeed, challenging is a fundamental human right. It cannot be sanctioned in itself. Only the offenses that arise from it can be repressed. In democratic regimes, such a right is not banned. On the contrary, it is framed, organized, and even provided with jurisdictional protection in certain cases, so that it is not perverted and does not degenerate into an offense.
This total disregard for citizens' opinions and this determination to push through the constitutional referendum as conceived in the draft constitution proposed by the steering committee create legitimate suspicions about the CPT's unstated interests and attest to the arbitrary nature of the referendum decree.
As long as reflections on constitutional law remain so poor, the country will never achieve democracy. There is only a very restricted group of jurists who master this field. In most cases, they are either excluded, intimidated, exiled, or assassinated (physically or morally).
Furthermore, the CPT punishes a set of referendum offenses with both fines and imprisonment. For example, Article 90 provides for sanctions against the destruction of posters or advertising placards related to the referendum campaign.
For its part, Article 99 punishes contempt of a CEP official in the exercise of their duties. Should this offense be qualified as contempt of magistracy or lèse-majesté? In any case, the analysis of this referendum decree shows that the CPT considers it a simple administrative act that it exercises not in the name of the nation but in its own name, as a sovereign.
A constitution is not imposed on a people. It must be accepted by consent and adherence, not by force and intimidation. Unless it emanates from the arbitrary will of a group and aims to establish an autocratic power. The CPT should have avoided such suspicions which certainly affect the legitimacy of the process and which risk, even, compromising its application and durability in the future.
In other words, even if the current government had done everything to secure the vote for the draft new constitution, a large part of the population will continue to challenge it. The decree of July 3 will not be able to prevent citizens from exercising their right to express themselves freely on major decisions engaging the nation. This right is a democratic conquest that cannot be taken away by any tyrant or any legal text.
Furthermore, Article 104 establishes penalties against misleading a citizen or inducing them to abstain from voting through the use of false news, slanderous expressions, or other fraudulent maneuvers, either directly or with the help of a third party.
Double the penalty is provided against any person arrested on the order of a referendum office authority or a judicial authority when the foreseen offenses are committed as part of the execution of a plan throughout the country or in several of its locations.
Penalties are pronounced by the correctional court, without delay, at the requests and prosecutions of the public prosecutor's representative based on the report of the referendum office. (Art 108)
The arbitrary nature of the referendum is justified not only by its freedom-restricting aim but also by its lack of foundation. Indeed, it does not refer to any reference text that could justify the legitimacy of the presidential council and its acts. It is therefore clear that the referendum decree is both an arbitrary and illegitimate act.
Finally, by not referring to the April 3, 2024 agreement and the constitution of March 29, 1987, the two main texts that could have served as its legitimacy, the CPT assumes that the referendum decree is not only arbitrary but also attests that it exercises power without any foundation. This, at the same time, calls into question the timeliness of the referendum process.
The referendum decree has no foundation and attests that the referendum process has no legitimacy
The April 3 agreement is the foundation upon which the vision of the transition rests, but it has never been published in the Monitor, despite numerous protests from some members of the Montana agreement, including Magalie Comeau Denis, who has never ceased to criticize the CPT. In a sense, the latter abused the trust of the political parties and civil society organizations that transferred power to it following Ariel's unprecedented abdication.
Considering that the CPT has never established the institutions provided for in the decree of November 23, 2024, and the agreement of April 3, 2024, such as: the governmental action control body, the national security council, the truth, justice, and reparation commission, the assembly of sectors, the conciliation commission, it was evident that the referendum process would face serious difficulties.
These institutions were meant to create favorable conditions for holding elections and the constitutional referendum. Instead of establishing them, the CPT jealously concentrates all powers in its hands and, paradoxically, creates conditions favorable to insecurity, division, polarization of the country, political conflicts, dictatorship, political exclusion, and intimidation.
The CPT's boycott of the referendum process is not a last-minute decision. Nor is it the result of a few constraints or certain technical errors attributable solely to the competence and qualification of the leaders. It is a carefully considered, meticulously planned, but clumsily executed act. In short, it is a premeditated act, an ambush.
Furthermore, the CPT's act of referring to Jovenel's referendum decree, which was, however, repealed, and not referring to the amended 1987 constitution in the referendum decree would technically mean that the CPT does not derive its legitimacy from the amended 1987 constitution.
To be honest, I have always assumed that the CPT does not derive its legitimacy from the constitution of March 29, 1987. Otherwise, it would not be a de facto power. However, by shrewdly avoiding referring to the April 3 agreement and the amended 1987 constitution in the referendum decree, it does not realize that not only does the latter have no legitimacy, but its power also has no foundation.
Two questions then arise:
- What is the act (instrumentum) that established the transfer of power exercised by the Transitional Presidential Council?
- Who are the drafters and signatories of this act?
With the publication of the referendum decree, the CPT gets bogged down in its contradictions and calls into question not only the draft constitution but also the timeliness of the referendum process. It refers neither to the April 3, 2024 agreement nor to the amended 1987 constitution, yet it evokes decrees and institutions that derive their legitimacy from these two foundational texts.
For the decrees of July 17, 2024, and May 23, 2024, it is clear that they are inspired by the April 3, 2024 agreement; however, for the institutions, it is not entirely clear that this is the case. The analysis of the fifth recital of the referendum decree is quite revealing.
Indeed, this recital states:
« Whereas the legislative power is currently inoperative and there is a need for the executive power to legislate by decree on matters of public interest. »
The analysis of this recital reveals a serious inconsistency between it and the preambular clauses of the referendum decree. Indeed, in the April 3, 2024 agreement, the parliament is replaced by the governmental action control body (OCAG). Therefore, logically, it is the latter that the CPT should have evoked in this fifth recital and not the legislative power, which has never existed for it.
The CPT did not refer to the 1987 constitution simply to escape criticism and challenges from those who question the constitutionality of the referendum process. But it forgets that legislative power is an institution enshrined by the said constitution.
However, by asserting that it is the inoperability of the legislative power that authorizes it to legislate by decree on matters of public interest, the CPT does not realize that it tacitly recognizes the existence of the amended 1987 constitution. This is a real muddle.
Conversely, this recital technically justifies the accusation of high treason evoked by lawyer Patrick Pierre Louis to challenge the title of the working document prepared by the steering committee and its publication in the official gazette of the republic, along with the qualification of the members of said committee to claim the exercise of such a right. The CPT is caught in its own trap. It has no way out of this legal imbroglio.
Ultimately, a careful analysis of the preambular clauses and recitals shows that the three (3) decrees mentioned above, namely, the decree of April 10, 2024, establishing the CPT, that of May 23 concerning the organization and functioning of the CPT, and that of July 17, 2024, determining the organization and functioning of the national conference, appear to be the only legal texts that would serve as legitimacy for the CPT and the referendum decree.
Again, such a thesis does not hold. It is a legal absurdity!
Indeed, the CPT and Ariel's government, as organs of the executive power, are constituted powers that exercise the prerogatives of derived or delegated constituent power in an exceptional context. Consequently, it cannot derive its legitimacy from itself. It must absolutely derive it from an authority that is hierarchically, and thus democratically, superior to it and that would play the role of original constituent power.
The original constituent power is the expression of national sovereignty. As such, it is theoretically the entity that delegates its exercise to the three powers of the State. In constitutional law, it is rightly called the sovereign. That is why it is generally said that all power is delegated.
If this superior authority that delegates the exercise of power to the CPT is neither the April 3, 2024 agreement nor the amended 1987 constitution, it means that there is none. In this case, the CPT is not only the expression of national sovereignty or the one who exercises it, it is the sovereign itself. This is what the preambular clauses of the referendum decree technically convey.
From this perspective, it becomes logical that legal rules and severe sanctions are provided against all those who dare to challenge the decisions of the sovereign. This is why challenging is not considered a simple offense. It is implicitly considered a crime of lèse-majesté.
In other words, through this decree, the members of the CPT assume that the regime they lead is closer to monarchy than to democracy. Imagine the legal cacophony in which a power analogous to that of a king, but led by several authorities simultaneously, operates. No regime can function with such doctrinal inconsistencies.
The rational interpretation of the different parts of the referendum decree, particularly the preambular clauses, recitals, and operative part, leads to the conclusion that the CPT exercises power without any legitimacy and produces an arbitrary and baseless referendum decree to regulate an untimely referendum process.
This act of the Transitional Presidential Council once again brings us back to the perennial questions for which the entire nation must demand honest and courageous answers from its members.
- In whose name and for whom does the CPT govern the nation?
- Who entrusted it with the mission to change the 1987 constitution?
- For whom is it drafting this new constitution?
While awaiting a frank answer to these legitimate questions, history will record that a body named CPT, which enjoys no form of legitimacy, had given itself the power to change a constitution drafted by a national constituent assembly which, itself, derives its legitimacy from citizens from all strata and all regions of the country.
Conclusion
The technical analysis of the preambular clauses and recitals of the referendum decree proves that the latter is indeed an arbitrary and baseless act, an ambush, a crime against democracy. Paradoxically, it announces the new transition that the country will experience at the end of the presidential council's mandate on February 7, 2026. It is a political act, an act of strategic repositioning.
It must be fought by all the country's vital forces, all intellectuals, and all those who understand the dimension of the Haitian crisis. Because, beyond these low blows and unhealthy political games, motivated solely by the stakes of power struggles and the immediate interests of political actors, there is a dying people, a nation in agony, and a dignity to rebuild!
Me Kedlaire Augustin
- Former Vice-President of the Senate
of the Republic.
- Former President of the Constitutional Reform Commission of the Senate of the Republic.